Faculty News
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Professor Laura Veldkamp's joint research on information sharing in US Treasury auctions is featured
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Excerpt from the Financial Times -- "Using auction data and game theory, the authors came to the conclusion that full pre-auction information sharing between dealers and investors would raise $4.8bn more revenue for the US Treasury each year than a fully closed bidding mechanism where no information is shared. The paper comes from New York Fed economists Nina Boyarchenko and David Lucca, along with NYU professor Laura Veldkamp."
Faculty News
Professor Laura Veldkamp's joint research on information sharing in US Treasury auctions is featured
—
Excerpt from the Financial Times -- "Using auction data and game theory, the authors came to the conclusion that full pre-auction information sharing between dealers and investors would raise $4.8bn more revenue for the US Treasury each year than a fully closed bidding mechanism where no information is shared. The paper comes from New York Fed economists Nina Boyarchenko and David Lucca, along with NYU professor Laura Veldkamp."