Press Releases
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Information Sharing in U.S. Treasury Auctions: The Case for Why it Creates Value for Investors and Decreases Risk
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![Laura Veldkamp Laura Veldkamp](/sites/default/files/styles/192w_x_144h/public/assets/images/lveldkamp_feature.jpg?h=cd55d432&itok=WEQP4xMp)
New research from NYU Stern Professor Laura Veldkamp and Nina Boyarchenko and David O. Lucca of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, finds that information sharing in U.S. Treasury auctions raises auction revenues, as bidders are better informed. When information sharing enables collusion, the collusion initially costs revenue, but prohibiting information sharing costs more.
Press Releases
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![Laura Veldkamp Laura Veldkamp](/sites/default/files/styles/192w_x_144h/public/assets/images/lveldkamp_feature.jpg?h=cd55d432&itok=WEQP4xMp)
New research from NYU Stern Professor Laura Veldkamp and Nina Boyarchenko and David O. Lucca of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, finds that information sharing in U.S. Treasury auctions raises auction revenues, as bidders are better informed. When information sharing enables collusion, the collusion initially costs revenue, but prohibiting information sharing costs more.