New Public Economic Theory Study Findings Have Been Published by Scientists at New York University
Politics & Government Week
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"We study the policy choices of an incumbent politician when voters imperfectly observe aggregate spending and the incumbent's ability," researchers in New York City, United States report.
"We show that total spending is decreasing in the transparency of spending, but increasing in the transparency of the incumbent's ability. The model further provides a possible explanation of the choice of inefficient tools of redistribution, and investigates the incentives for politicians to manipulate public accounts," wrote A. Gavazza and colleagues, New York University.
The researchers concluded: "We show that politicians may choose inefficient and manipulable tools, but that this choice has positive welfare consequences because it leads to a reduction in spending."
Gavazza and colleagues published their study in the Journal of Public Economic Theory (Transparency and Manipulation of Public Accounts. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2011;13(3):327-349).
For additional information, contact A. Gavazza, New York University, Dept. of Economics, Leonard N Stern School Business, 44 W 4th St., New York City, NY 10012, United States.
Publisher contact information for the Journal of Public Economic Theory is: Wiley-Blackwell, Commerce Place, 350 Main St., Malden 02148, MA, USA.
This article was prepared by Politics & Government Week editors from staff and other reports. Copyright 2011, Politics & Government Week via VerticalNews.com.